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The categoricity problem and truth-value gaps
Ian Rumfitt
In a recent paper,1 T. J. Smiley has revived, and advanced a solution to, an
important but neglected problem in logical theory – that of finding
‘categorical’ axiomatizations for logical calculi. Using rules of rejection, he
solves the problem for the classical propositional calculus, and for predicate
and modal systems based upon it. As I show, however, his method of
axiomatization breaks down over calculi that permit truth-value gaps –
breaks down, indeed, even over the central cases of compact calculi that clas-
sify sentences simply as true, as false, or as neither. I produce a method that
handles these cases, and illustrate it by giving a categorical axiomatization
for a propositional fragment of Smiley’s own (1960) free predicate calculus.
1.  The categoricity problem, and Smiley’s solution to it
In understanding what the categoricity problem is, and why it matters, it
helps to consider a popular and plausible view of the meaning of the logical
constants. On this view, most persuasively expounded by Hacking (1979),
the introduction rules (and/or the elimination rules) which govern the logi-
cal constants in a sound and complete deduction system for a calculus2 are
understood as giving the meaning of those constants (as they are used in
that calculus). Those who adopt this position typically understand ‘sound
and complete’ to mean ‘sound and complete in respect of the consequence
relation’.3 That is to say, they have in mind systems in which a formula A
is deducible from a set of formulae X just when every admissible valuation
of the calculus that verifies all the members of X also verifies A.4 However,
1 Smiley 1996. All unqualified page references are to this article.
2 Following Smiley, I shall call such a system an axiomatization of the calculus. The
term is somewhat unhappy: in many contexts, it is important to distinguish between
axioms and rules. But it is widespread, and I know of no better.
3 Although Hacking’s own position is subtly, but importantly, different; see fn. 8
below.
4 The admissibility of a valuation may of course vary from calculus to calculus. I say
that a valuation verifies a formula A when it evaluates A as true, falsifies A when it
evaluates A as false, fails to verify A when it does not evaluate A as true, etc.
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when understood in this way, the view is untenable. For consider (1) the
standard two-valued propositional calculus alongside (2) the calculus that
differs from (1) only inasmuch as it admits the valuation that verifies every
formula of the relevant propositional language. As Smiley observes, ‘logi-
cal consequence is the same relation in calculi (1) and (2), for it depends
exclusively on the impossibility of the premisses being true and the conclu-
sion false’ – i.e. on the calculus’s not admitting a valuation that verifies all
the premisses while falsifying the conclusion – ‘and the possibility or other-
wise of their all being true is irrelevant’ (p. 7). Accordingly, any deduction
system that is sound and complete (in the present sense) with respect to
calculus (1) will also be sound and complete with respect to calculus (2),
so that the standard introduction and elimination rules for ‘»’ are compat-
ible with an interpretation whereby ‘»’ behaves as in calculus (2). But in
calculus (2) P and »P can both be true, i.e. are not so much as contraries.
This surely shows that the standard rules fail to capture an important
aspect of the intended meaning of ‘»’. Indeed, as Smiley notes, the problem
here generalizes, for ‘the device by which (1) and (2) are differentiated can
be applied anywhere, so axiomatization of the usual sort can never exclude
unintended interpretations of any calculus’ (p. 8). We have, then, a general
‘failure of categoricity at the sentential level’ (ibid.).
Smiley’s paper presents a solution that preserves the spirit of the popular
and plausible view. He begins by introducing into the language a primitive
sign of rejection, ‘*’, which is used in such a way that ‘*P’ ‘indicates dissent
from the proposition expressed by P’ (p. 2). The star may be attached to
any formula of the original language, but as an indicator of force it cannot
be iterated. With the language so enlarged, and where the members of X,
and A, are now starred or unstarred formulae,5 we may define the Smiley
consequence relation f of a calculus to be the relation for which X f A iff
every admissible valuation of the calculus that verifies all the formulae that
appear unstarred in X, and falsifies all the formulae that there appear
starred, verifies the formula in A (should it appear unstarred) or falsifies it
(should it appear starred) (cf. p. 5). All the traditional logical notions are
definable in terms of Smiley consequence. For example, formulae P and Q
are contraries iff P f *Q, sub-contraries iff *P f Q, contradictories iff
5 Even though there is no perceptible difference between them, it is crucial to under-
standing Smiley’s treatment that one keep in mind the categorial difference between
a formula tout court and an unstarred (or asserted) formula. With some misgivings,
but in order to ease comparison with his treatment, I shall follow him in not making
this difference formally perspicuous, relying instead upon context, and explanatory
glosses, to fix the intended meaning. Those who disapprove will have no trouble
making the relevant difference in category perspicuous, for example by reviving the
Fregean ‘use of the turnstile to indicate assertion [so that] *P and g P are immediately
seen to be co-ordinate items’ (p. 6).
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P f *Q and vice versa (p. 8). More generally, as he also shows (ibid.), the
relation of Smiley consequence suffices to determine the entire sentential
output of the calculus. That is to say, it determines the classification of
every assignment of truth values (across all the formulae of the calculus
simultaneously), as being either admissible or inadmissible (cf. p. 7). Now
the sentential output of a calculus itself settles ‘all the traditional concerns
of logic’ (p. 7). Accordingly, if we can find an axiomatization that is sound
and complete with respect to Smiley consequence, then its rules will deter-
mine the meaning of the relevant constants – or as much of that meaning
as is of proper concern to the logician. Smiley duly provides such an
axiomatization, some of whose rules of course specify when a formula may
be rejected, rather than specifying when it may be affirmed. His axiomati-
zation includes, for instance, the rules ‘From *P infer »P’ and ‘From »P
infer *P’ (p. 5). We can, then, see the meaning of a symbol like ‘»’ as being
given, not only by its standard, affirmative, introduction and elimination
rules, but by those rules in tandem with the appropriate rules for rejection.
2.  Calculi for which Smiley’s solution is inadequate
Smiley’s way with the categoricity problem is highly attractive. As he says,
however, ‘the value of rejection as a solution to the general problem of
sentential categoricity depends on one’s being able to axiomatize at least
the obvious candidates’, and there are cases where his own method of
axiomatization breaks down. That method rests upon6 a particular ‘form
of reductio ad absurdum (the dots stand for side premisses): if … A g B and
… A g (*)B then … g (*)A’ – where ‘(*)A’ signifies starring an unstarred
formula or unstarring a starred one (p. 5). Accordingly, we can apply
Smiley’s method of axiomatization only to those calculi in which this form
of reductio is sound, i.e. in which
if X, A f B and X, A f (*)B, then X f (*)A,
where A and B are arbitrary starred or unstarred formulae, where X is an
arbitrary set of such formulae, and where the comma indicates set-
theoretic union, so that X, A is X ∪ {A}.
Let us suppose, however, that we are dealing with a calculus that admits
valuations in which some formulae are neither true nor false – i.e. that
admits ‘truth-value gaps’ – and ask whether Smiley’s version of reductio is
sound for such a calculus. It ought to strike us that we have here two ques-
tions; for two notions of rejection, or of dissent from a proposition, can
and must be distinguished in such circumstances. In identifying the first of
these notions, it will help to quote the passage in which Smiley introduces
6 See especially p. 5, where this version of reductio is deemed ‘the one principle that is
always necessary for completeness, either as a primitive or a derived rule’.
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his own rejection sign:
A mechanism for rejection is there for anyone who wishes to use it, in
the shape of an answer to a yes-or-no question. Questioner and
answerer are usually different people, but if one puts the question to
oneself, one comes up with the forms ‘P? Yes’ and ‘P? No’. I suggest
that ‘…? Yes’ is a very passable realization of Frege’s assertion-sign …,
and that ‘…? No’ is an equally passable realization of a rejection-sign
(p. 1).
Now it is reasonable to suppose that there will be an exact correspondence
between declarative sentences which are to be evaluated as neither true nor
false, and yes-or-no questions which are to be answered by neither ‘yes’ nor
‘no’. Indeed, one might go so far as to claim that the plausibility of assess-
ing ‘The present King of France is bald’ as neither true nor false rests upon
the inappropriateness of giving either of the expected answers to the ques-
tion ‘Is the present King of France bald?’7 But, however that may be, a
rejection sign which is explained in Smiley’s way, as the correlate of the
answer ‘No’, will precisely amount to an indication that the relevant
proposition is being rejected as false. And this kind of rejection – internal
rejection, as I shall call it – differs from the rejection of a proposition as
merely being not true. If you do not believe that there is a present King of
France, you will not wish to answer ‘No’ to the question ‘Is the present
King of France bald?’. You will, however, certainly refuse to give the
answer ‘Yes’, and so in another perfectly good sense you will have
dissented from, or rejected, the proposition expressed by ‘The present King
of France is bald’. Let us call this second, more inclusive, kind of rejection
external rejection.
There is nothing paradoxical about there being two kinds of rejection in
these cases. On the contrary. Smiley’s strategy is to explain negation by
invoking our prior understanding of the activity of rejecting (cf. p. 4).
Since, when dealing with truth-value gaps, we certainly need to distinguish
7 If it could be defended, such a claim would provide a ground for assessing certain
statements as neither true nor false that was independent of the desirability of giving
‘a truth-functional account of the formation of complex statements by means of
operators’, and would thereby controvert a key thesis of Dummett 1959 (I quote
from his p. 14). I shall not attempt any such defence here, but it is noteworthy that
Dummett himself concedes ‘that, if we had concerned ourselves with interrogative
rather than assertoric force, we should have found a reason for distinguishing two
undesignated truth-values for atomic sentences, even in accounting only for the use
of these sentences on their own’ (1981: 425). Moreover, his ground for not so
concerning himself is none other than the claim that giving ‘the answer “No” [to a
question] is precisely tantamount to, and is best analysed as, an assertion of the
negation of the sentence uttered in interrogative form’ (ibid., emphasis added).
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between internal and external negations (‘The King of France isn’t bald’ vs
‘It is not true that the King of France is bald’), it is unsurprising that we
need to distinguish between internal and external modes of rejection.
However, we need to ask which, if either, of these modes of rejection vali-
dates the version of reductio upon which Smiley bases his axiomatization,
and here things are not as his discussion might lead one to expect. If ‘*’ is
understood as indicating external rejection, then the Smiley consequence
relation must be understood as obtaining between X and A just in case
every valuation that verifies all and only the formulae that appear
unstarred in X verifies the formula in A (should it appear unstarred) or fails
to verify it (should it appear starred). Accordingly, if we have that X, A f B
and that X, A f (*)B, we shall have that: every valuation that verifies all
and only the formulae that appear unstarred in X, A both verifies and fails
to verify the formula in B. It follows that no valuation verifies all and only
the formulae that appear unstarred in X, A, so that every valuation that
verifies all and only the formulae that appear unstarred in X will fail to
verify the formula in A (if it there appears unstarred) or will verify it (if it
there appears starred). But the formula in A there appears starred just in
case it appears unstarred in (*)A, and vice versa, so that we have:
Every valuation that verifies all and only the formulae that appear
unstarred in X will verify the formula in (*)A (if it there appears
unstarred), or will fail to verify it (if it there appears starred).
This is precisely the condition for X f (*)A. Hence, Smiley’s rule of reductio
is sound when ‘*’ is given the external interpretation.
Matters stand otherwise, however, when it is given the internal interpre-
tation. In this case, there is no call to revise the definition of Smiley
consequence: we shall have X f A iff every admissible valuation that veri-
fies all the formulae that appear unstarred in X, and falsifies all the
formulae that appear starred, verifies the formula in A (should it appear
unstarred) or falsifies it (should it appear starred). Now from the premisses
X, A f B and X, A f (*)B, we can certainly infer that no valuation verifies
all the formulae that appear unstarred in X, A and falsifies all the formulae
that there appear starred. However, we cannot conclude that every valua-
tion that verifies all the formulae that appear unstarred in X, and falsifies
all the formulae that there appear starred, verifies the formula in (*)A
(should it appear unstarred) or falsifies it (should it appear starred). For it
is possible that that formula is neither verified nor falsified. Indeed, with
this in mind, a definite counter-example to the soundness of reductio is
easy to construct. For consider a propositional calculus that conforms to
the ordinary truth tables when all the sentence letters are assigned values,
but which assigns no truth value to any formula containing a sentence
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letter to which no truth value has been assigned. In such a calculus we have
that P &»P f P and P &»P f *P, but we do not have f *(P &»P). (Any
valuation that fails to assign a value to P makes (P & »P) truth-valueless,
rather than false.) Accordingly, internal rejection does not conform to
Smiley’s rule of reductio, and the logic of an internal negation sign (which
corresponds to internal rejection) cannot be axiomatized in Smiley’s way.
In fact, the situation is rather worse than this may suggest. We have been
discussing the problem of axiomatizing the relationship of Smiley conse-
quence in calculi that permit truth-value gaps, but that relationship was of
interest only insofar as it determined sentential output, and in the calculi
that now concern us, this determination no longer holds good. For
consider (1) the classical, two-valued propositional calculus (whose Smiley
consequence relation will be written as ‘f1’) alongside (2) a supervalua-
tional calculus that permits truth-value gaps but whose Smiley
consequence relation f2 is so defined that X f2 A just when X f1 A. By defi-
nition, calculi (1) and (2) share a Smiley consequence relation, but they do
not share a sentential output. In (1), there is no admissible valuation that
neither verifies nor falsifies a sentence letter P; in (2) there is. And while (1)
and (2) agree in respect of the traditional logical notions of contrariety,
contradictoriness and the like (for the definitions of those notions in terms
of Smiley consequence stand), that only brings out the need for some non-
traditional notions to capture the differences between them. For example,
in calculi (1) and (2), P and »P are contraries, for in neither calculus can
both formulae be true. But in (2), unlike (1), both formulae can fail to be
true.
3.  Categorical axiomatizations for simple calculi with truth-value gaps
It lies far beyond the scope of this paper to try to solve the categoricity
problem in general for calculi that permit truth-value gaps. I shall,
however, present a straightforward solution for calculi of this kind that are
simple – in the sense that they classify sentences simply as true, as false, or
as neither – and that also exhibit a kind of compactness (to be spelled out
in fn. 10). The argument of §2 shows that before we can set about trying
to find a suitable axiomatization, we need to know which semantical rela-
tionship we should be trying to axiomatize, and here a comparison with
Smiley’s procedure can help us. As he notes, for the sort of calculi that
concern him ‘the items [that specify a calculus’s sentential output] are all
of the form “It is possible/impossible to assign truth to every member of Γ
and falsehood to every member of ∆”, where Γ and ∆ exhaust the
sentences’ (p. 8). In other words, if we dispense with the modal operator
in favour of quantification over valuations, each item appears in the form
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There is/isn’t a valuation that assigns truth to every member of Γ and
falsehood to every member of ∆.
In the calculi that concern us, it cannot be assumed that Γ and ∆ exhaust
the well-formed formulae of the language. However, in the case of a simple
calculus permitting truth-value gaps, the sentential output may be specified
by a list of items in the form:
There is/isn’t a valuation that assigns truth to every member of Γ,
assigns falsehood to every member of ∆, and assigns neither value to
every member of Ε,
where Γ, ∆ and Ε do exhaust the formulae. Now let us say that a valuation
assigns an appropriate value to a starred or unstarred formula if the
formula in question is valued true when unstarredor false when starred, and
that it assigns an inappropriate value if the formula is valued false when
unstarred or true when starred. Then we can define the Smiley multiple-
conclusion consequence relation fm for a calculus to be the relation that
obtains between two sets X and Y of starred or unstarred formulae just in
case every valuation that assigns an appropriate value to every member of
X assigns an appropriate value to some member of Y. Accordingly, where
F is a set of formulae, where *F is the result of prefacing every formula in
F with ‘*’, and where the comma (on both sides of the consequence sign)
indicates set-theoretical union, we shall have that X f/m F,*F just in case
there is a valuation that assigns an appropriate value to every member of
X without assigning any value to any formula in F. Hence the statements
There is/isn’t a valuation that assigns truth to every member of Γ,
assigns falsehood to every member of ∆, and assigns neither value to
every member of Ε,
are equivalent respectively to Γ,*∆ f/m Ε, *Ε and to Γ,*∆ fm Ε,*Ε. So, if we
can find axioms and rules which are sound and complete with respect to
the fm relation of a calculus, then we will have a categorical characteriza-
tion of that calculus, for every item of the sentential output will be
equivalent to a statement of deducibility or non-deducibility, so that the
given axiomatization will exclude any other sentential output.
The reader may wonder whether the rejection sign is needed at all once
the conclusion of the consequence relation is allowed to be a set of formu-
lae rather than a formula, since this liberalization suffices to deal with the
motivating example of §1. In a classical multiple-conclusion calculus, we
shall have X f ∅ just in case no valuation verifies all the members of X, so
that the rule ‘From A,»A infer ∅’ excludes the valuation that verifies all
the formulae of the language. Indeed, for a classical calculus, the use of a
multiple-conclusion system constitutes an alternative solution to the cate-
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goricity problem. The principles A,»A f ∅ and ∅ f A, »A jointly dictate
that A and »A are to be contradictories, and a classical calculus will admit
a valuation in which all the formulae in Γ are true and all the formula in ∆
are false just when Γ,»∆ f/ ∅.8 Matters stand otherwise, however, with a
system that permits truth-value gaps. A set of formulae Y is a multiple-
conclusion consequence of a set of formulae X if every valuation that veri-
fies all the members of X verifies at least one member of Y, but specifying
the extent of this relation gives no information as to whether an unverified
formula is false or is neither true nor false. Accordingly, the standard rela-
tion of multiple-conclusion consequence fails to determine the sentential
output of a calculus that permits gaps. The sign of rejection is still needed.
It is clearly essential to the current proposal that the star should be
understood as indicating internal rejection, and every subsequent occurrence
of it in this paper is to be taken as such. For only when it is so taken do we
get the required correspondence between starring a formula and evaluating
it as false. We know, then, that an axiomatization of the fm relation cannot
be based upon a generalization of Smiley’s rule of reductio, but reflection
upon the circumstances in which that rule goes awry suggests the necessary
emendation. As we saw, the inference from X, A f B and X, A f (*)B to
X f (*)A fails when ‘*’ is understood internally because there might be a
valuation that assigns an appropriate value to all the members of X while
assigning no value whatsoever to the formula in A. And this possibility can
be excluded whenever every valuation that assigns some value to all the
formulae in X also assigns a value to the formula in A. Let us use the nota-
tion ‘[X]’ to stand for the set of formulae in X, and ‘[A]’ to stand for the
formula in A; and let us say in such a case that [X] determines [A]. Then,
if we can find some appropriately syntactic way of specifying this relation-
ship of determination, we shall be able to include as a sound rule this
version of reductio:
From X, A g B and X, A g (*)B infer X g (*)A whenever [X] determines
[A].
These considerations generalize to the multiple-conclusion case. Let us
say that one set of formulae determines another in a calculus just in case
every admissible valuation of that calculus that assigns a truth value to all
the members of the first set assigns a truth value to all the members of the
second. Then, where fm is the Smiley multiple-conclusion consequence
8 It is this insight that underpins the ‘Do-It-Yourself’ semantics of Hacking 1979, and
explains why the treatment of classical logic given in that paper is not subject to the
strictures of §1. For the rules that Hacking takes to determine the meanings of the
constants are the rules of a sequent calculus, conceived as a metalogical theory of
multiple-conclusion deducibility.
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relation for an arbitrary calculus, where Z, Z′, X, Y, Y′ are sets of starred
or unstarred formulae, and where A is a single starred or unstarred
formula, we have that:
If Z, X fm A,Y and Z′, X fm (*)A, Y′, then Z, Z′ fm (*)X, Y, Y′, so long
as [Z, Z′] determines [X].
For suppose not. Then there is a valuation v that assigns appropriate values
to all the members of Z, Z′ while assigning no appropriate value to any
member of (*)X, Y, Y′. Since [Z, Z′] determines [X], v must assign inappro-
priate values to every member of (*)X, and hence must assign appropriate
values to every member of Z, X and to every member of Z′, X. But since
Z, X fm A,Y and Z′, X fm (*)A,Y′ – and since v assigns no appropriate
value to any member of Y,Y′ – it must assign appropriate values to both A
and (*)A. That, however, is impossible.
Where, then, ‘g’ indicates multiple-conclusion deducibility, we are
assured that the following rule will be sound with respect to any of the
calculi that are under consideration:
Reductio If Z, X g A,Y and Z′, X g (*)A,Y′, then Z, Z′ g (*)X,Y,Y′,
so long as [Z, Z′] determines [X],9
and, in tandem with the usual structural rules for multiple-conclusion
systems, it is the cornerstone of our axiomatizations. Those structural rules
are:
Overlap If X overlaps Y, then X g Y
Dilution If X′ g Y′, where X′ ⊂ X and Y′ ⊂ Y, then X g Y
Cut If – for some set Z – X, Z1 gZ2,Y for every partition
〈Z1, Z2〉 of Z, then X g Y,
(cf. Shoesmith and Smiley 1978, p. 29), and with Reductio they yield a
useful rule of Dilemma. For suppose that X,(*)A g Y, where A is a starred
or unstarred formula. Then, by Dilution, we have X, (*)A g (*)A, Y and
X,(*)A g A, Y. By Reductio, this gives X g A, Y on condition that [X] deter-
mines [{A}]. Accordingly, if X, A g Y and X, (*)A g Y then X, A g Y and
X g A,Y, so that by Cut we have X g Y. (〈∅,{A}〉 and 〈{A}, ∅〉 are the only
partitions of the set {A}). We have, in other words, the derived rule of
Dilemma If X, A g Y and X,(*)A g Y then X g Y, on condition that
[X] determines [{A}].
Another consequence of Reductio is Ex Falso Quodlibet in the form: If
9 Here, and until further notice, I shall use ‘determines’ as a placeholder for the appro-
priate syntactic specification. Note that determination is a relation between sets of
formulae of the relevant calculus, not between sets of starred or unstarred formulae.
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X g A and X g (*)A then X g Y, for any set Y. (In Reductio, take Z = Z′ = X,
X=Y= Y′ = ∅, A = A. Since, trivially, [X] determines ∅, we have X g (*)∅,
whence X g Y, for any set Y, by Dilution.) It is possible to derive similarly
a rule of reversal in the form:
Reversal If X g Y and [Y] determines [X] then (*)Y g (*)X.
These rules suffice to establish the main lemma in a Henkin-style complete-
ness proof – namely, that any consistent set of starred or unstarred
formulae may be extended to produce another consistent set that is in a
suitable way maximal. More exactly, if we suppose that the deducibility
relation is compact in the sense that whenever U g V then U′ g V for some
finite subset U′ of U, we have the following
Lemma: For any sets of starred or unstarred formulae X and Y such
that X g/ Y, there is a set  ⊃ X for which  g/ Y, and such that for any
formula Φ determined by [X], either the corresponding unstarred
formula Φ is a member of  or the corresponding starred formula *Φ
is. Moreover,  is closed with respect to formulae that [X] determines,
in the sense that for any such formula, a corresponding starred or
unstarred formula is deducible from  only if it is a member of .
Proof: Enumerate the formulae of the language as Φ1, Φ2, …, and define a
sequence of sets X1, X2, … of starred or unstarred formulae according to
the rule:
X0 = X
Xn, Φn if Xn, Φn g/ Y
Xn +1 = Xn, *Φn if Xn,*Φn g/ Y
Xn, otherwise
Then define  to be the union of all the Xn. It is plain from the construc-
tion that Xn g/ Y for every n, so that  g/ Y by the compactness of the
deducibility relation. To establish that  possesses the relevant kind of
maximality, suppose that neither Φ nor *Φ is in , where Φ is, for defi-
niteness, Φn. That can only be because Xn +1 = Xn, whence Xn, Φ g Y and
Xn, *Φ g Y. Now if [X] determines {Φn }, so does [Xn], whence Xn g Y, by
Dilemma, contrary to Xn g/ Y. Thus [X] cannot determine {Φn }, alias {Φ}.
That is to say, for any Φ for which [X] determines {Φ}, either Φ ∈  or
*Φ ∈ . To show that  is closed in the relevant sense, suppose that [X]
determines [{A}], that  g A, but that A ∉ . By maximality, (*)A ∈ ,
whence  g (*)A and  g Y, by Ex Falso Quodlibet, contradicting X g/ Y.
Q.E.D.
In selecting a calculus with which to illustrate the application of this
lemma in proving completeness, I can do no better than to choose a
propositional calculus that is a fragment of a predicate system presented in
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Analysis for 1960 by Smiley himself – although it is worth stressing that
the method of proof extends straightforwardly to the predicate case, and
hence yields a categorical axiomatization for Smiley’s version of the free
first-order calculus.10 The primitive symbols of this fragment are: a sign for
(internal) negation ‘»’ – defined so that »A is false when A is true, and is
true when A is false, and is otherwise left without a truth value; a sign for
(internal) conjunction ‘&’ – defined so that A & B is true when A and B are
both true, is false when one of A and B is false and the other is either true
or false, and is otherwise left without a value; and a unary operator T, to
be read ‘it is true that’ – defined so that TA is true if A is true, and is false
in every other case. As Smiley remarks (1960: 131), this system makes
possible the rigorous definition of the notion of presupposition that
concerned Strawson and his followers; and the external connectives are
definable within it using the relevant internal connective together with the
truth operator. Thus the external negation of A may be identified with»TA.
In formulating rules which comprise a sound and complete axiomatiza-
tion of the Smiley multiple-conclusion consequence relation for this
calculus, and hence constitute a categorical axiomatization of it, the first
task is to specify the determination relation in an appropriately syntactic
way. Let us say that one formula occurs vulnerably in another if the first
occurs in the second, but outside the scope of the T operator. Then it is
clear from the semantical rules of the calculus that [X] determines [Y] just
in case every sentence letter that occurs vulnerably in some formula in [Y]
also occurs vulnerably in some formula in [X]. This specification should be
understood to replace the term ‘determines’ in the formulation of Reduc-
tio, Dilemma and Reversal; for, as I said, that term was no more than a
placeholder. And we get a complete axiomatization of our calculus by
appending to those rules, so understood, the structural rules together with
the following rules for the individual connectives:
1. From »A infer *A
2. From *A infer »A
3. From A & B infer A
10 The method also applies to a number of other simple calculi admitting truth-value
gaps, but it is limited by the requirement that the deducibility relation shall be
compact. Such a relation can be sound and complete only for calculi which display
the semantical analogue of this kind of compactness, as some calculi admitting truth-
value gaps do not. (If, for example, the language of a calculus contains an infinite
number of sentence letters, and no valuation is permitted to assign truth to every
sentence letter, but everything else is standard, then the empty set is a semantical
consequence of the set of all sentence letters, but not of any finite subset of it.) All the
same, this limitation does not prevent the method from working across a broad and
central class of cases.
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4. From A & B infer B
5. From A, B infer A & B
6. From A infer TA
7. From TA infer A.
It should be noted that (5) yields ‘From *(A & B) infer *A,*B’ by Reversal
(because {A & B} determines {A, B}), but that (3) does not yield ‘From *A
infer *(A & B)’ ({A} does not determine {A & B}). Similarly, while (7) yields
‘From *A infer *TA’ (because {A} determines {TA}), (6) does not yield
‘From *TA infer *A’ ({TA} does not determine {A}). However, {A} determines
{»A} and vice versa, so we can apply Reversal to establish the inter-deduci-
bility of a formula and its double negation.For, reversing (1), we have ‘From
A infer *»A’ and, from (2), ‘From *»A infer»»A’; while from (1), we have
‘From»»A infer *»A and, from reversing (2), ‘From *»A infer A’. It should
also be noted that the deducibility relation corresponding to these rules is
compact in the sense specified above, so that the lemma is applicable.
In establishing the completeness of these rules, we suppose that X g/ Y,
and note that the lemma asserts the existence of a set  which includes X,
for which  g/ Y, and which is closed with respect to formulae that [X]
determines. We then define a valuation v such that, for any sentence letter P,
v(P) = T iff [X] determines {P} and P ∈
v(P) = F iff [X] determines {P} and *P ∈ .
That is to say, any sentence letter undetermined by [X], v leaves without an
assignment. We then have the following
Theorem: (a) For any formula A such that [X] determines {A}, v(A)=T
iff A ∈ , v(A) = F iff *A ∈ ;
(b) for any formula A such that [X] does not determine {A}, v(A) ≠ T and
v(A) ≠ F.
Completeness follows directly from this theorem. The valuation v plainly
assigns appropriate values to all the members of X. However, it does not
assign an appropriate value to any member of Y. For if an arbitrary
formula B in [Y] is not determined by [X], then v assigns it no value at all.
While if B is determined by [X], and (for example) appears unstarred in Y,
then if v gave it an appropriate value, it would value it as T, showing by
the theorem that B ∈ , whence  g Y by Overlap, contradicting the
assumption that X g/ Y. (The argument is similar if B appears starred.) That
is to say, if X g/ Y, then X f/m Y, which is precisely the condition for complete-
ness with respect to multiple-conclusion consequence.
The proof of the theorem is, as usual, by induction on the complexity of
the formula A. The base case follows directly from the definition of v, and
we have three inductive cases:
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Case 1: A = »B. For (a) we note that [X] determines {A} iff [X] determines
{B}. So for determined A we can argue: (1) v(A)=T iff v(B)=F iff *B ∈
(by the inductive hypothesis) iff »B ∈  (by rules 1 and 2) iff A ∈ ; (2)
v(A)=F iff v(B)=T iff B ∈  (by ind. hyp.) iff »»B ∈  (see above) iff
»A ∈  iff *A ∈  (by rules 1 and 2).
For (b), suppose e.g. that v(A)=T but that [X] does not determine {A}.
Then v(B)=F even though [X] does not determine {B}, contradicting the
inductive hypothesis.
Case 2: A = B & C. (a) ([X] determines {A} and v(A)=T) iff ([X] deter-
mines {B} and [X] determines {C} and v(B)= v(C)=T) iff (B ∈  and
C ∈ ) (by inductive hypothesis) iff A ∈  (by rules 3, 4, 5). Also ([X]
determines {A} and v(A)=F) iff ([X] determines {B} and [X] determines {C}
and either v(B)=F while v(C)=T/F or v(C)=F while v(B)=T/F) iff (*B ∈
and either C ∈  or *C ∈ ; or *C ∈  and either B ∈  or *B ∈ ). Now
by Dilution of rules 3 and 4 we have ‘From A & B infer A, B’, ‘From A & B
infer A,*B’, ‘From A & B infer *A, B’ whence by Reversal ‘From *A,*B
infer *(A & B)’, ‘From *A, B infer *(A & B)’, and ‘From A,*B infer
*(A & B)’. Hence the chain of biconditionals can be extended thus: iff
*(B & C) ∈  iff *A ∈ , as required.
For (b), suppose that v(A)=T/F but that [X] does not determine {A}.
Then v(B)=T/F and v(C)=T/F even though [X] fails to determine either
{B} or {C}, contradicting the inductive hypothesis.
Case 3: A = TB. Then [X] determines {A} irrespective of the status of B, so
we have only to establish clause (a). Now v(TB)=T iff v(B)=T iff B∈
(by inductive hypothesis) iff TB ∈  (by rules 6 and 7). And v(TB)= F iff
*TB ∈  follows directly from maximality.
This completes the proof of the theorem, and with it the identification of
rules that are categorical for the calculus under consideration.11
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